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Abstract
School choice dominated discourses within educational policy in the last year; some have even
described 2021 as “the year of school choice.” School choice allows public education funds to
follow students to the schools or services that best fit their needs. This is often summarized by its
advocates as “funding students over systems.” Generally, school choice allows market forces to
influence education by providing more competition in the education market. Teachers’ unions
have fought against school choice measures for years, but what impact do they have? This
undergraduate thesis compares 49 states to determine if the proportion of public school teachers
in teachers’ unions in a given state serves as a proxy to measure the impact of unions and to
discover whether teachers’ unions influenced whether a state passed new school choice
legislation in 2021. By employing a binary logistic regression analysis, the results provide
evidence that as the share of public school teachers who are union members increases, a state’s
likelihood to pass new school choice legislation increases. This thesis gives a broad view of the
impact teachers’ unions have on school choice at the state level, but more research detailing the
ways unions leverage these effects and how politicians respond to teachers’ unions in their states
would be valuable.
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Introduction
Education rose to the forefront of political and academic discussions the past year for a
plethora of reasons, a main reason being that many people see a need for improvement in public
schools. Public schools experienced significant drops in enrollment as homeschooling families
doubled from 5.4% of households in the spring of 2020 to 11.1% of households in the fall of
2020 (Eggleston & Fields, 2021). Multiple explanations elucidate this explosive growth, one
explanation being the growing dissatisfaction with public schools. Amid this dissatisfaction with
public schools, support for school choice programs, such as vouchers, charter schools, and
educational savings accounts, is growing steadily. A Real Clear Politics survey found that 71%
of voters support school choice and 65% support funding “students over systems” (2021).
School choice stirs up intense policy debates among politicians and leaders, usually along
party lines. Generally, Republicans favor school choice while Democrats oppose school choice
but this is not always the case (DeBray-Pelot et al., 2007). Among those most vocally opposed to
school choice are teachers’ unions (Carl, 1994; Constant, 2006), such as the National Education
Association (NEA) and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Generally, teachers’ unions
oppose school choice, claiming school choice “defunds public schools.” This means lower
wages, fewer jobs, less resources, and higher competition for unions and their members.
Teachers’ unions function like monopolies in many ways, sometimes even as state-sanctioned
monopolies. As monopolies they work to prevent competition that would disrupt their interests,
thus teachers’ unions oppose school choice.
Teachers’ unions undoubtedly play an important role in the economy of education as they
donate money to political campaigns, encourage members to vote for their endorsed candidates,
and engage in collective bargaining. Leaders need an improved understanding of the impact
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teachers’ unions have on educational policy because tracking the effect of teachers’ unions on
legislation is difficult. This thesis attempts to provide part of that understanding by comparing 49
states to discern the impact teachers’ unions have on school choice legislation from a national
perspective
Studies predict that the school closures and policies resulting from the COVID-19
pandemic will “likely to lead to a reduction in global economic growth equivalent to an annual
rate of 0.8 percent” (Psacharopoulos et al., 2021). This reduction will be most felt by developed
economies that depend on highly educated workers. For the economy to mitigate these losses the
American public school system should consider every policy available to ensure that children
receive the best education available to them. Policies that provide free market incentives should
especially be considered because these policies supply a level of accountability not found in a
monopolized market.
Adjusted to 2021 dollars, America spent $5,802 per student in the public school system in
1972 (National Center, 2019). Adjusted to 2021 dollars, America spent $13,701 per student in
the public school system in 2019 (National Center, 2019). This 136% increase in spending has
not been accompanied by an equal increase in academic achievement (Hanushek, 1997). In fact
for many of those years academic achievement declined (Meckler, 2022) . Perhaps the problem
is not how much funding but who receives the funding.
Review of Literature
School Choice
School choice allows public education funds to follow students to the schools or services
their families choose. This happens in several ways. First, charter schools exist as a non-profit
alternative to public schools; charter schools are government-funded schools that operate
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independently of the public school system. This allows them to exercise greater independent
control over disciplinary actions, curriculum, and staffing (Sowell, 2020). Charter schools are
more productive than public schools because they operate at a lower cost than traditional public
schools (Hoxby, 2003). Some studies claim that charter schools have little to no positive effects
on student achievement (Bettinger, 2005) while others provide evidence of increased academic
performance, particularly for students who stay in charter schools for three or more years
(Greene et al., 1999). Charter schools provide competition to public schools which motivates
public schools to better serve families’ needs. Charter schools functionally turn what was once a
monopoly into an oligopoly or into a truly free market.
In addition to charter schools, tuition vouchers are another common form of school
choice. Vouchers bestow families, usually with a specified low income, with money to spend on
eligible education expenses, usually tuition. Some vouchers can be used for private tuition, other
vouchers cannot. Voucher programs vary from state to state and city to city; each program differs
in effects. In Florida, the McKay Scholarship program gives vouchers to eligible disabled
students so they can attend schools that better fit their needs. One study found that the McKay
Scholarship Program positively impacts public schools by lowering the likelihood of a student
being diagnosed with a disability by 12% (Winters & Greene, 2011). Multiple articles provide
evidence that public schools engage in strategic misdiagnosing of students to relieve financial
and testing pressures (Greene, 2007; Winters & Greene, 2011). But disabled students are not the
only minorities aided by vouchers; black students who left public schools for private schools
experienced a 6.3% increase in test scores after using vouchers for three consecutive years
(Peterson et al., 2003).
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Similar to a voucher, an educational savings account (ESA) is another form of school
choice, often referred to as the “gold standard” of school choice by its advocates. An ESA
functions like a Health Savings Account (HSA), allowing families to make tax-exempt, capped
contributions to an account designated for educational expenses such as private tuition, tutoring
services, and homeschooling supplies. ESAs provide the most choices to families among all
forms of school choice.
While the literature is mixed, several studies demonstrate evidence of positive impacts of
school choice for students, especially for poor and minority students. These positive effects
include increased productivity within public schools (Buerger & Bifulco, 2019; Hoxby, 2003;
Jabbar et al., 2019); improved academic results depending on the structure of the program
(Jabbar et al., 2019; Peterson et al., 2003); and even positive effects for students who remain in
public schools (Egalite & Wolfe, 2016; Winters, 2012). One study even found that students who
did not attend public schools were less likely to be anti-semitic and were more likely to display
more positive attitudes towards Jews (Greene, 2017). Overall, these studies provide evidence that
school choice programs are solutions worth considering for the problems plaguing the American
public school system.
Unions, Their Goals, and Effects
Interest groups have long leveraged their campaign contributions to support legislators
sympathetic to their goals (Brunell, 2005; Hall & Wayman, 1990). One of the main functions of
unions today is to function as an interest group. While unions are prohibited by federal law from
contributing to political campaigns for federal offices, unions can give money to PACs which can
give money to these campaigns. These contributions from teachers’ unions have steadily
increased over recent years (Open Secrets, 2021). Adjusted for inflation into October 2021
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dollars, donations from the NEA are up from $5.12 million in the 2000 election cycle to $48.03
million in the 2020 election cycle (Open Secrets, 2021). For the AFT the difference is $5.70
million in the 2000 election cycle to $18.42 million in the 2020 election cycle (Open Secrets,
2021). This substantial increase in spending is extremely relevant to researchers investigating the
impact of special interest groups, unions, and PACs on elections and legislation.
At their core, unions follow a rent-seeking hypothesis. That is, unions seek to extract
additional benefits from policymakers and employers without increasing their own contributions
toward productivity (Hoxby, 1996). Teachers’ unions leverage their influence to increase
teachers’ salaries, improve working conditions, and generally increase benefits for teachers’
union members. They achieve this by advocating for smaller class sizes which are easier to
manage and also forces schools to hire more teachers (union members). Unions also negotiate
powerful job protections, which may lead schools to hire and keep more teachers, including
teachers of poor quality, than is optimal for the same level of salary expenditures (Eberts &
Stone, 1984; Sowell, 2020). The end result is an environment where unions receive these rents
without contributing any equivalent gains to school productivity (or even harming productivity)
as measured by student achievement (Eberts & Stone, 1984).
Early research on the impact of interest groups largely overestimated the impact of
groups’ financial contributions to legislators (Kau et al., 1982). In addition to interest group
contributions, the party’s position, signals from constituents, and personal ideology affect roll
call votes (Chappell, 1982; Kau & Rubin, 1993). The effects of contributions on roll call voting
were found to be more influential on votes central to a group’s agenda, but less influential on
issues peripheral to the group’s agenda (Constant, 2006).
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Constant (2006) specifically found this to be true for the Florida voucher bill, HB 752,
which was heavily opposed by teachers’ unions, yet passed with a slim margin in 1998.
However, the Florida bill SB 1996/1182 that expanded charter schools passed in 1996 with
widespread support. Constant (2006) argues the broad political support occured because the
charter school bill was not as threatening to the teachers’ unions and thus it was peripheral to
their interests. However, this study focuses on the time period before the massive increase in
PAC spending which began with the 2000 election cycle and before the wave of school choice
legislation passed in 2021.
Unions and Political Participation
Besides PAC contributions, unions have another way of leveraging political power; union
members are also voters. A common assumption is that union members favor Democratic
candidates, but while recent elections have cast doubt on this assumption, teachers’ unions still
overwhelmingly support the Democratic party. At their lowest point in the past two decades,
93% of all campaign contributions to individual candidates from teachers’ unions in a given
election cycle went to Democrats (Open Secrets, 2021). While this level of one-sided support is
not perfectly mirrored by the voting habits of teachers’ union members, members still tend to
vote in favor Democratic candidates.
First, union members are more likely to vote than non-union members. In his working
paper Richard Freeman found that union members were about 10-13 percentage points more
likely to vote than non-union members, but among members and non-members with comparable
characteristics this falls to 4 percentage points (2003). But members of teachers’ unions are even
more likely to vote. A study of 70 school districts in California, a state where over 90% of
teachers belong to a union, found that teachers were six times more likely to vote than non-
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teachers (Moe, 2006). Moe also found that the influence of teachers’ unions is so strong in
school board elections that the support of a teachers’ union is often more advantageous than
incumbency (2006).
Correspondingly, Freeman also found that union members favor Democratic candidates
by 2 points. For teachers’ union members this trend is even stronger. First, all teachers have
college degrees, a demographic that favored Joe Biden by 12 points (Andre et al., 2020). Second,
most teachers are female, a demographic that favored Joe Biden by 15 points (Andre et al.,
2020). These two points combined with the reality that the AFT, NEA, and the Chicago
Teachers’ Union all endorsed Joe Biden for President in 2020 deliver strong evidence that
teachers’ union members favor Democratic candidates.
Unions and Collective Bargaining Agreements
In addition to campaign contributions and voting, teachers’ unions achieve their goals
through collective bargaining which is legal in 45 states. A study of California school districts
found that districts with stronger teachers’ union presence created greater constraints and
allowed less flexibility to school administrators than districts with a weaker union presence
(Strunk & Grissom, 2010). Collective bargaining also drives schools to keep lower quality
teachers and pay those teachers more than they would in the absence of collective bargaining
(Brunner & Squires, 2013; Eberts & Stone, 1984; West & Mykerezi, 2011). Some studies
estimate that through collective bargaining unions are able to attain salaries at least 5% higher
than they would be otherwise (Cowen & Strunk, 2015).
Framework
At a national level several problems complicate any attempt to complete an empirical
study of the financial influence of teachers’ unions on state elections. First, the sheer size and
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scope of teachers’ unions make such a national study a Herculean task. Sixty-nine percent of
public school teachers are members of unions or similar employee associations (National Center,
2018), and the NEA is the largest union in America with over 3 million members. A study
tracking all $48 million of the NEA’s 2020 political donations, while enlightening and beneficial,
would be nearly impossible to conduct based on the volume of donations alone.
Second, each state has different campaign finance laws. A study investigating each state
legislator to find the impact teachers’ unions and their PACs have on the legislator’s voting
behavior would take an enormous amount of time and resources, if such a study could be
conducted in the first place. For context, of the $66.4 million donated by teachers’ unions in the
2020 election cycle, over $59.5 million was “soft money” (Open Secrets, 2021). “Soft money” is
largely unregulated by the FEC, but it cannot be used to support individual candidates in federal
elections. No cap exists on soft money for political parties and spending organizations. Since the
vast majority of teachers’ unions’ donations are soft money, tracking the influence of those
dollars is nearly impossible. Even looking at money given to PACs would be grueling and
difficult because teachers’ unions like the NEA and AFT give to hundreds of PACs each year,
and these donations to PACs constitute less than a fifth of all political spending from teachers’
unions.
Since school choice legislation advances or falls primarily at the state level, a study
comparing states must find a way to transcend state differences. While campaign finance laws
vary among states, every state has teachers and every state has teachers’ unions. This thesis asks
two questions that provide a starting point for future research efforts: 1) does the proportion of
teachers that are union members have an impact on the passage of new school choice legislation?
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and 2) does the proportion of union membership serve as a suitable proxy for measuring the
effects of teacher’s unions?
This influence may manifest itself in different ways such as voting, signaling, political
volunteering, or campaign donations. By looking at the presence of teachers’ unions in general,
this study attempts to combine all of these means of influence to examine whether teachers’
unions affect school choice legislation at the state level. Additionally, this study seeks to
determine if the percentage of public school teachers that are union members is even a helpful
variable. Combining all the effects of unions into one variable, how many teachers are union
members, may not be a helpful way to measure union influence. Further studies that focus on
volunteering, voting, or campaign contributions for individual states will provide a clearer
picture for the specific ways that teachers’ unions influence school choice legislation at the state
level.
Methodology and Data
School Choice Legislation
The response variable of this study is simply whether a state passed legislation in 2021
that created new school choice programs. This data comes from the American Federation for
Children, which lists every school choice bill that was passed in 2021 (School Choice Victories,
2022). Twenty-two states passed school choice legislation in 2021, however this study only
counts 8 of those states, those with new programs. This paper seeks to discover how teachers’
unions influence new legislation. As the Nobel Prize winning economist Milton Friedman
shrewdly observed, “Nothing is so permanent as a temporary government program.” While
Friedman advocated for school choice programs, his observation on the permanence of
government programs still applies. Incredible difficulty must be overcome to rescind school
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choice programs, especially given their popularity among parents (Heise, 2012). Teachers’
unions know this and as pragmatic organizations teachers’ unions should fight harder against
new programs, rather than spending their resources to oppose current programs.
Teacher’s Union Presence
This study also relies on data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES),
an agency within the Department of Education. Each year the NCES sends out a variety of
surveys to schools across the nation, including the National Teacher and Principal Survey
(NTPS). The most recent NTPS results are from the 2017-2018 school year. Part of these results
include the percentage of public school teachers that are members of a union or an employee
association similar to a union (Appendix A). This NTPS had a response rate of over 50%, and it
provides the data for the independent variable that measures the presence of teachers’ unions in a
given state. Maryland did not have a satisfactory response rate and is excluded from this study. It
follows that as the share of teachers’ who are union members increases, a state should be less
likely to pass new school choice legislation.
Teacher Salaries and Public School Revenue Receipts
Last, this study includes the mean annual public school teacher’s salary and the public
school revenue receipts per student based on fall enrollment. Both of these numbers can be found
in the NEA’s annual “Ranking of the States 2020 and Estimates of School Statistics 2021” (NEA,
2021). The NEA’s Research Department has produced this report yearly since 1952; the report,
“shows how states compare on a variety of education and funding measures, such as average
teacher salaries, enrollment, student-teacher ratios, general financial resources, and revenue and
expenditures for the most recent school year” (NEA, 2021).
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These variables are included because teachers who receive higher salaries want to keep
those higher salaries, and they should behave accordingly to protect their interests. These high
salaries are usually secured through collective bargaining with the help of teachers’ unions. Thus,
the higher a teacher’s salary, the more likely they are to oppose school choice. The salaries used
in this study are the mean salary for a public school teacher for 2019-2020 (Appendix B).
The variable measuring revenue receipts per student also follows this line of thinking;
states with higher receipts have administrators who are more jealous of those receipts and who
should fight harder against school choice measures which may reduce those receipts. The figure
used in this study is the amount of revenue a public school received per student enrolled at the
start of the 2019-2020 school year (Appendix C).
Educational Ranking
Furthermore, this model includes a variable that measures each state’s national education
ranking as measured in U.S. News (Pre-K - 12 Rankings, 2021). These rankings reflect an array
of measurements including college readiness as measured by ACT and SAT scores, high school
graduation rate, math and reading scores from the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP), and pre-school enrollment. The NAEP has been billed “the nation’s report card” by the
Department of Education. This data was collected in 2019 and is the most recent data available
from the NAEP. This ranking is included because legislators should take into account their
constituents’ needs when writing legislation. If a state is producing poor educational outcomes, a
reasonable legislator would hopefully consider a wide array of solutions, even ones that may be
inconvenient among their donors. Thus, the worse a state’s educational ranking, the more likely
that state’s government should be to pass new school choice legislation.
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Political Party
Any model seeking to explain the forces preventing or propelling school choice
legislation would be incomplete without some measure of the political party in control of the
legislature. The percentage of state legislators that are Democrats is included to provide this
explanatory variable.
Model
For each state, s, whether a new school choice bill is passed is a function of unionization,
average state salaries for public school teachers, revenue receipts per student, educational
ranking, and Democratic presence in the legislature; specifically expressed as:
𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑠= β0+ β1𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠+ β2𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑠+ β3𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠+
β4𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠+ β5𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠+ ε𝑠
where 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑠 denotes whether a particular state passed new school choice legislation in
2021. β1is the coefficient of primary interest, the coefficient on the presence of teachers’ unions.
The estimated coefficient on the presence of teachers’ union represents the impact teachers have
in either opposing or encouraging school choice legislation. Since this equation simply measures
the percentage of public school teachers that are union members, the specific means of influence
are not captured by this equation. The central hypothesis is that teachers’ unions do impact
whether a state passes new school choice legislation. The null hypothesis assumes that teachers’
unions do not significantly impact new school choice legislation, stated as H0: 𝜇union = 0. This
null hypothesis equation is repeated for each independent variable.
Results
Table 1 displays the results of estimating the successful passage of new school choice
legislation in 2021. After conducting a binary logistic regression test, the null hypothesis was
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rejected at the 90% confidence level for both the union and salary variables. The adjusted R2
value was 20.37%. None of the variables had a high VIF and so multicollinearity was not an
issue. The full binary logistic regression analysis can be found in Appendix D.
Table 1
Term

Coef

SE Coef

Z-Value

P-Value

Constant

7.16

4.19

1.71

0.087

union

3.67

2.05

1.79

0.074*

1.90

teacher salary

-0.000150

0.000087

-1.73

0.084*

2.02

revenue per student

-0.000018

0.000134

-0.13

0.895

2.06

-0.0310

0.0264

-1.17

0.240

1.59

-3.05

2.78

-1.10

0.272

1.99

education ranking
Democratic legislature

VIF

*p<0.10

Deviance R-Sq = 31.84%
Deviance R-Sq(adj) = 20.37%
P(1) =
Y' = 7.16 + 3.67 union - 0.000150 teacher salary - 0.000018 revenue per student
- 0.0310 education ranking - 3.05 Democratic legislature
Teachers’ Unions
Recall the central hypothesis: teachers’ unions do impact whether a state passes new
school choice legislation. The p-value for the variable measuring union influence is statistically
significant at the 90% confidence level, but not in the expected way because of its positive
coefficient: 3.67. This means that for every 1 unit increase in union membership, the log odds of
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a new school bill passing increase by 3.67. This model provides evidence that states with a
higher proportion of teachers that are union members are more likely to pass new school choice
legislation. While this result may appear unexpected at first, some likely explanations are
presented in the discussion.
Teachers’ Salaries
The average salary of public school teachers was found to be statistically significant at
the 90% confidence level, albeit with a coefficient of -0.000150. The evidence for the impact of
salaries is small but negative as predicted. Additionally, the salary of a public school teacher may
serve as a proxy for the opposition that was expected to be present in the union presence
variable. Nevertheless, the effect of teachers’ salary is minor.
Limitations
All research includes limitations and this undergraduate thesis is no exception. First, the
different variables rely on data that was not collected in the same year, but in the most recent
years data was available. The variable measuring the percentage of public school teachers that
are union members was gathered in 2018. After looking at union levels in multiple states, no
significant drop in teachers’ union membership from 2018 to 2021 was found. The salaries of
public school teachers and the revenue receipts for public schools are from 2020. The education
ranking is from 2021. Second, the writer of this thesis did attend a small private school with a
yearly tuition of $6,500 from 2nd-12th grade; and this certainly influenced his views on
education and school choice.
Discussion
Given the positive coefficient for the union variable, an important question must be
addressed: does this model provide evidence that teachers’ unions are supportive of new school
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choice legislation? This is likely not the case. First, legislators may be responding to teachers’
unions in a counterintuitive way, meaning that legislators may be trying to diminish the influence
of teachers’ unions in local education policy by passing school choice legislation. The effects of
teachers’ unions are best seen at the local level where they tend to dominate school board
elections and where they secure benefits through collective bargaining (Moe, 2006). Perhaps
state legislators passed new school choice legislation in 2021 attempting to combat the political
efforts of unions in their states. Even if the literature were not clear that unions dislike school
choice, unions like the NEA and AFT have made their opinions clear. A quick glance through the
website or Twitter feed of the NEA or AFT confirms that they do not support school choice. The
model’s positive coefficient is not evidence that unions or their members had a sudden change of
heart in 2021 as states passed school choice legislation. Rather, this positive coefficient is more
likely to be evidence for the response of state legislatures to the presence and influence of
teachers’ unions.
Additionally, the model did not find evidence that political party was a significant
influence on the passage of new school choice legislation. This could mean that state legislators
are mirroring the views of their constituents; the vast majority of Americans support a plethora
of school choice reforms according to a Real Clear Politics survey (2021). Convexly, it may
mean that politicians, regardless of party, are equally likely to vote for new school choice
legislation.
Overall, the percentage of public school teachers that are union members appears to be a
poor proxy for the intended effects of teachers’ unions. The opposition to school choice that
teachers’ unions hold was not adequately found or measured in this model. Future research that
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measures the volunteering efforts, media campaigns, or political donations of unions to specific
legislators will be helpful to further elucidate this issue.
As states continue to explore ways to improve educational access and quality, innovative
and empowering solutions will be needed. If those solutions are to be successful and transparent,
the effects of various stakeholders on the legislative process and the effects of the legislation on
the constituents must be empirically discerned. This undergraduate thesis provides a starting
point for future research efforts and supplies evidence that a more descriptive model should be
narrower in scope. Future studies will be more enlightening by focusing on individual bills or
states, not on the nation as a whole.

20
References
Andre, M. et al. (2020, Nov. 3). “National exit polls: how different groups voted.” The New York
Times https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/elections/exit-polls-president.
html.
Bettinger, E. (2005) The effect of charter schools on charter students and public schools,
Economics of Education Review, 24(2) 133-147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.
2004.04.009.
Brunell, Thomas L. (2005). The relationship between political parties and interest groups:
explaining patterns of PAC contributions to candidates for Congress. Political Research
Quarterly, 58(4), [University of Utah, Sage Publications, Inc.], 681–88,
https://doi.org/10.2307/3595653.
Brunner, E. J., & Squires, T. (2013). The bargaining power of teachers’ unions and the allocation
of school resources. Journal of Urban Economics, 76, 15-27.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2013.01.003.
Buerger, C. & Bifulco, R. (2019), The effect of charter schools on districts’ student composition,
costs, and efficiency: The case of New York state. Economics of Education Review, 69,
61-72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2019.01.003
Carl, J. (1994). Parental choice as national policy in England and the United States. Comparative
Education Review, 38(3), 294-322. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1189064.
Chappell, H. W. (1982). Campaign contributions and congressional voting: a simultaneous
probit-Tobit model. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 64(1), 77–83.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1937945.
Constant, L. M. (2006). When money matters: campaign contributions, roll call votes, and
school choice in Florida. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 6(2), 195–219.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41289386.
Cowen, J. M., & Strunk, K. O. (2015). The impact of teachers’ unions on educational outcomes:
What we know and what we need to learn. Economics of Education Review, 48, 208-223.
DeBray-Pelot, E. H., Lubienski, C. A., & Scott, J. T. (2007). The institutional landscape of
interest group politics and school choice. Peabody Journal of Education, 82(2-3),
204-230. https://doi.org/10.1080/01619560701312947/.

21
Eberts, R. W., & Stone, J. A. (1984). Unions and Public Schools: The Effect of Collective
Bargaining on American Education. Lexington Books, DC Heath and Company, 125
Spring Street, Lexington, MA 02173.
Egalite, A. J., & Wolf, P. J. (2016) A review of the empirical research on private school choice,
Peabody Journal of Education, 91(4), 441-454, DOI: 10.1080/0161956X.2016.1207436.
Eggleston, C., & Fields, J. (2021). Census Bureau’s household pulse survey shows significant
increase in homeschooling rates in fall 2020. U.S. Census Bureau.
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/03/homeschooling-on-the-rise-during-covid19-pandemic.html.
Freeman, R. (2003, Sep.). What do unions do ... to voting? (Working Paper 9992). National
Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w9992.
Greene, J., Peterson, P., & Du, J. (1999). Effectiveness of school choice: the Milwaukee
experiment. Education and Urban Society 31(2) 190-213.
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0013124599031002005.
Greene, J. (2007). Fixing Special Education. Peabody Journal of Education, 82(4), 703-723.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25594767.
Greene, J. (2017). The relationship between public and private schooling and anti-Semitism.
Journal of School Choice 11(1) 111-130. https://doi.org/10.1080/15582159.2016.
1270143.
Hall, R. L., & Wayman, F. W. (1990). Buying time: moneyed interests and the mobilization of
bias in congressional committees. American political science review, 84(3), 797-820.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1962767.
Hanushek, E. (1997) Assessing the effects of school resources on student performance: an
update. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis 19(2) pp. 141-164.
http://hanushek.stanford.edu/publications/assessing-effects-school-resources-student-perf
ormance-update.
Heise, M. (2012). Law and and policy entrepreneurs: empirical evidence on the expansion of
school choice policy. Notre Dame Law Review 87(5), 1917-1940.
Hoxby, C. M. (1996). How teachers' unions affect education production. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 111 (3), 671–718, https://doi.org/10.2307/2946669.

22
Hoxby, C. M. (2003). School choice and school productivity. could school choice be a tide
that lifts all boats? The Economics of School Choice. In C. M. Hoxby (Eds.), The
Economics of School Choice (pp. 287-341). University of Chicago Press.
Jabbar, H., Fong, C. J., Germain, E., Li, D., Sanchez, J., Sun, W.-L., & Devall, M. (2019). The
competitive effects of school choice on student achievement: a systematic review.
Educational Policy. Retrieved April 24, 2021 from https://doi.org/10.1177/0895904819
874756.
Kau, J. B., Keenan, D., & Rubin, P. H. (1982). A general equilibrium model of congressional
voting. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97(2), 271-293.
https://doi.org/10.2307/1880758
Kau, J. B., & Rubin, P. H. (1993). Ideology, voting, and shirking. Public choice, 76(1-2), 151172. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30025700.
Meckler, L. (2022, Jan. 30). Public education is facing a crisis of epic proportions. Washington
Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/01/30/public-education-crisisenrollment-violence/.
Moe, T. M. (2006). The union label on the ballot box: how school employees help choose their
bosses. Education Next, 6(3), 58+. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A149158994
/AONE?u=tel_oweb&sid=googleScholar&xid=411018b2.
National Center for Education Statistics (2018) Percentage of public school teachers who
indicated that they were members of a union or an employee association similar to a
union, by state: 2017–18. [Data set]. Institute of Education Sciences.
https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ntps/tables/ntps1718_20111201_t1s.asp.
National Center for Education Statistics (2019) Total and current expenditures per pupil in
public elementary and secondary schools: Selected years, 1919-20 through 2018-19.
[Data set]. Institute of Education Sciences. https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest
/d21/tables/dt21_236.55.asp.
National Education Association (NEA). (2021 Apr.). Ranking of the States 2020 and Estimates
of School Statistics 2021. NEA. https://www.nea.org/research-publications.
Open Secrets. Teachers unions. (2021).
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=l1300.

23
Peterson, P., Howell, W., Wolf P., & Campbell, D. (2003). School vouchers: results from
randomized experiments. The Economics of School Choice. In C. M. Hoxby (Eds.), The
Economics of School Choice (pp. 107-144). University of Chicago Press.
Pre-K - 12 rankings. (2021). U.S. News.
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/rankings/education/prek-12.
Psacharopoulos,G., Collis, V., Patrinos, H.A., & Vegas, E. (2021, Apr. 8). The COVID-19 cost of
school closures in earnings and incomes around the world. Comparative Education
Review 65(2). https://doi.org/10.1086/713540.
Real Clear Opinion Research poll: school choice support soars. (2021, Apr. 6). American
Federation for Children. https://www.federationforchildren.org/real-clear-opinion
-research-poll-school-choice-support-soars/.
School choice victories. (2022). American Federation for Children.
https://www.federationforchildren.org/school-choice-victories/.
Sowell, T. (2020). Charter Schools and Their Enemies. Basic Books.
Strunk, K. O., & Grissom, J. A. (2010). Do strong unions shape district policies?: Collective
bargaining, teacher contract restrictiveness, and the political power of teachers’
unions. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 32(3), 389–406.
https://doi.org/10.3102/0162373710376665.
West, K. L., & Mykerezi, E. (2011). Teachers’ unions and compensation: The impact of
collective bargaining on salary schedules and performance pay schemes. Economics of
Education Review, 30(1), 99-108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2010.07.007.
Winters, M., & Greene, J. (2011). Public school response to special education vouchers: the
impact of Florida's McKay Scholarship Program on disability diagnosis and student
achievement in public schools. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 33(2),
138-158. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41238544.
Winters, M. (2012). Measuring the effect of charter schools on public school student
achievement in an urban environment: evidence from New York City. Economics of
Education Review 31 (2) 293-30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.08.014

24
Appendix A
Percentage of public school teachers who indicated that they were members of a union or
an employee association similar to a union, by state: 2017–18
State
United States

Member of a union or Employee Association
69.4

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

73.0
86.0
31.0
26.1
90.7

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida

57.2
97.0
89.2
‡
52.5

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

51.3
96.6
49.9
96.3
65.4

Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine

71.0
51.2
56.7
51.6
77.6

Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

‡
92.5
84.7
92.5
33.9

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

74.1
86.3
77.0
57.6
84.1

New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

95.7
43.4
97.4
19.9
73.6

25
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

91.7
59.4
93.1
92.2
88.9

South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

23.0
41.8
43.5
51.4
46.9

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

93.6
43.3
96.7
73.9
48.0
49.7

‡ Reporting standards not met. The response rate is below 50 percent.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, National
Teacher and Principal Survey (NTPS), "Public School Teacher Data File," 2017–18.
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Appendix B
Average salaries of public school teachers for 2019-2020
State
United States

Salary($)
64,133

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansa
California

54,095
72,010
50,782
50,456
84,531

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia

57,706
78,427*
64,853*
49,102
60,578

Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

65,409
52,875
68,803
51,745
58,184

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

51,320
53,907
51,566
55,276
73,444

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

84,290
63,568
58,663
46,843
50,817

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

52,135*
55,267
56,672
59,622
76,376*

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

54,256
87,069*
54,150
53,525
61,406

27
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

54,096
67,685
70,339
75,336*
53,329

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont

48,984
51,862
57,090
54,678
61,108*

Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

57,665
76,743
50,238
59,431
59,786

* NEA Estimate
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Appendix C
Public School Revenue Receipts Per Student in Fall Enrollment 2019-2020
State
United States

Revenue($)
15,673

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansa
California

11,854
20,422*
10,801*
11,812
16,358*

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia

13,897
22,692*
15,397*
11,493
13,088*

Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

16,897*
9,388*
19,786*
13,064*
13,855

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

14,287
13,362
13,578
17,388
18,180

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

20,581
13,039
16,492*
10,740
13,949

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey

12,831*
12,043*
11,236*
19,054
23,126*

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

14,863
30,662*
11,776
16,616*
15,062*

29
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

10,757
16,029
20,038*
18,754*
15,012

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont

12,718
10,332*
13,058
10,161
21,516*

Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

13,877*
18,625
13,759*
13,929*
19,519

* NEA Estimate
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Appendix D
Binary Logistic Regression: Bill passed versus union, teacher salary, revenue per student,
education ranking, Democratic legislature
Method
Link function
Rows used

Normit
49

Response Information
Variable
Bill passed

Value
1
0
Total

Count
8 (Event)
41
49

Regression Equation
P(1) = Φ(Y')
Y' = 7.16 + 3.67 union - 0.000150 teacher salary
- 0.000018 revenue per student
- 0.0310 education ranking - 3.05 Democratic legislature
Φ = CDF of the standard normal distribution

Coefficients
Term
Constant
union
teacher salary
revenue per student
education ranking
Democratic
legislature

Coef
7.16
3.67
-0.000150
-0.000018
-0.0310
-3.05

SE Coef
4.19
2.05
0.000087
0.000134
0.0264
2.78

Z-Value
1.71
1.79
-1.73
-0.13
-1.17
-1.10

Model Summary
Deviance Deviance
Area Under
R-Sq R-Sq(adj) AIC AICc BIC ROC Curve
31.84%
20.37% 41.73 43.73 53.08
0.8628

Goodness-of-Fit Tests
Test
Deviance
Pearson
Hosmer-Lemeshow

DF Chi-Square
43
29.73
43
28.34
8
3.54

P-Value
0.938
0.959
0.896

P-Value
0.087
0.074
0.084
0.895
0.240
0.272

VIF
1.90
2.02
2.06
1.59
1.99
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Analysis of Variance
Source
Regression
union
teacher salary
revenue per student
education ranking
Democratic legislature

Wald Test
DF Chi-Square P-Value
5
6.65
0.248
1
3.19
0.074
1
2.99
0.084
1
0.02
0.895
1
1.38
0.240
1
1.21
0.272

Fits and Diagnostics for Unusual Observations
Obs
15
35

Observed
Probability Fit Resid Std Resid
1.000 0.129 2.023
2.16 R
1.000 0.188 1.827
2.10 R

R Large residual

